

MINUTES OF IAC MEETING - 2 FEBRUARY 1949

DIRECTOR: The first item we have for discussion is General Irwin's suggestion that State compile a political affairs chapter to be used in the intelligence publications. The Standing Committee recommends that the State Department produce a Weekly on Political Intelligence and Policy Background Information for use in the Services' ~~SECRET~~ publications. Policy matters therein will be labelled by the State Department that they are not to be changed or reworded if published. Any comment, Park?

MR. ARMSTRONG: We have given a great deal of thought and attention to the question for the last two or three weeks and while we are not at the point of completion, it looks very hopeful and very optimistic that we will be able to undertake for all the other intelligence agencies, who want it, the issuance of a Weekly group of intelligence notes, or articles, including as mentioned there, matters dealing with policy, provided that those will be used verbatim, because the Department does not feel it could be put in a position of having its policy rewritten. There are a number of publications from the Department now that can be tapped and assembled and made available and are subject to no unforeseen barriers at the moment. I don't believe there will be any. I think we will be ready to go in a short while. We propose to do it on a weekly basis because of the publication schedules of the other agencies. Some are weekly, some are bi-weekly and some are monthly. They can adapt the material to their own publication requirements. The only restriction that I foresee is that matters that are labelled policy would have to be used verbatim, or not be used at all.

ADM. INGLIS: I am delighted with this development and I am strong for more of the same to eliminate, as far as possible, the duplication of effort and permit me to keep my people, with some reservation, on the naval side of intelligence. I think we will always have to have a small political intelligence staff in ONI to convert this material into shape for our customers, for instance, the Naval Commands. There is a great mass of

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information which might be of interest to an Ambassador and just a little that would be of interest to a Commander-in-Chief. But I have felt from the beginning a great deal could be done in reducing a duplication of effort and I am strong for anything that will accomplish that. I am delighted that we will get your material and I would like to see through the next months and years the evolution of that whole idea.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We recognize your need for some staff on political intelligence because of the inseparability and the lack of demarcation between political intelligence and military and naval intelligence or other, and as in the case of the Army, it will be necessary to have some staff that can handle it.

ADM. INGLIS: As to any departmental interpretation of your policy statements, I can assure you that ONI will not change one crossed "t" or dotted "i." We would like to be able to say that this is State Department material.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We can see that.

ADM. INGLIS: If you wanted it said that way, it wouldn't be proper for us to issue something and say it was a Navy Department pronouncement when it was State Department material. And certainly, if we did that, it wouldn't be right or even legal to alter it in any way.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That is true in that particular kind of material. We are not directing how you would use intelligence material. That could be rewritten.

DIRECTOR: Dr. Colby?

DR. COLBY: Nothing.

DIRECTOR: General Irwin?

GEN. IRWIN: We are cutting all political reporting down on the strength of this and I am changing the character of the document we are putting out to a Weekly Newsletter in addition to a Monthly slick paper magazine, so your thing will fit me perfectly.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That is good.

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GEN. IRWIN: And we will change nothing and will state that it is State Department material.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I might say for the record that the Intelligence Division of the Army has been very forward looking in its approach to political intelligence and has come to an arrangement whereby they are going to leave basic political intelligence entirely to the State Department intelligence organization and continue only to have an interest in current staff intelligence - which I think is a major and important step forward in coordination.

DIRECTOR: You are getting into the big leagues when you get into the slick paper publications.

GEN. IRWIN: There is one difficulty - in the South American Republics we never know when the military will become the political and ~~vice~~ versa. I told the Attaches to lay off the political reporting, but the military takes over so frequently -

ADM. INGLIS: You can never completely divorce the military and the political. You have a situation in China and Greece where you can't separate them.

GEN. IRWIN: We will handle the military implication as a military feature; otherwise, it is your baby. (Addressed to Mr. Armstrong)

ADM. INGLIS: They have to keep a running estimate of political intelligence to know when the military has to step in.

GEN. IRWIN: We will have to do some political intelligence, but we hope to have the State Department do the bulk. I am very pleased.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We reciprocate.

DIRECTOR: Any more comments?

GEN. MOORE: I agree.

GEN. TODD: It will be very useful to us, Admiral Hillenkoetter. It will permit us to get more timely information in the Joint Staff. We appreciate it very much.

DIRECTOR: We will go ahead and say it has to be done.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: We will carry forward and set a date for commencing the issuance of this in the very near future. I don't think it would take more than a week or two to get started on a trial run and then actually go a little after that.

DIRECTOR: We will skip to the third item, Transliteration, because there will probably be more discussion on the second. There will not be much on this one. Our people in OCD and in the Map Section, ORE, as well as ICAPS, would like to get in touch with the linguists of various departments to standardize a method of spelling geographical names, particularly in Arabic, Chinese and Russian. In your Slavic languages some use a double "f" at the end of a word, and some use one "f", etc.

GEN. IRWIN: Isn't there a book out on that now?

DIRECTOR: There is one on geographical place names, but that is not very comprehensive. I certainly think in the Armed Services they should be the same.

MR. ARMSTRONG: How about the Board of Geographical Names? They have been laboring with this and trying to standardize them.

DIRECTOR: As far as they go, we should take it.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Don't they issue a Gazetteer of the World, or do they just act on individual name places?

DIRECTOR: They have issued a Gazetteer before, but I don't know when.

MR. CHILDS: Not of the world in all of these languages. They are usually South American and New England and things like that.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We would be glad to do that.

MR. MacCARTHY: Mr. Armstrong, the B.G.N. started off with domestic names and during the war got into foreign names. When they decide, whether it is a place name or name of an individual, under the law, it has to be used throughout the Government Service. However, their system is not compulsory, so today there are about three systems, and some linguists favor one over another. When "k" is used, it should be used all the time instead of sometimes using "c." Some biographic intelligence reports sent to high staff meetings overseas were insufficient in helping to recognize that this name applied to this man. Thus, the special committee has the

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coordination effort between the IAC Agencies.

GEN. IRWIN: What should we do? Adopt one and stick to it?

DIRECTOR: Yes, I think you get your board of linguists to adopt one and stick to it. If you have Japanese, it depends upon the school where you learned the language. In Pearl Harbor in decrypting messages, one school would leave out a "y" and another would put it in. It depended on the method you used to learn the language.

MR. MacCARTHY: We have had one meeting within the CIA in which we set up two ad hoc committees - one on the Slavic languages and one on the Far Eastern. What we would like to do is have you pass the word to someone within your Agency to work with these two ad hoc committees on the agency needs.

DIRECTOR: Are there any objections to that?

GEN. MOORE: No.

GEN. IRWIN: No.

DIRECTOR: The next item is publicity of intelligence. That was brought up to see whether or not an NSCID should be issued on the thing. I talked to Admiral Souers and he said he didn't think it would be necessary and that Mr. Forrestal didn't think it was necessary, that it ought to be done by the individual departments. And so on that we took the stand that you didn't need an NSCID. We will hear about it and if any other agency wants to bring it up we will back it either way.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We don't see any need for an NSCID on it.

ADM. INGLIS: When I saw the copy of your letter, dated January 28, I must say that I blew a fuse. In the first place, technically, that paper, that discussion was not introduced by the Navy, but by the Director of Central Intelligence. I don't deny that I had some discussion with the Director before the proposal was made, but it was made by the Director of Central Intelligence, and the paper signed by Mr. Childs said the "Navy suggestion" and the "Navy proposal" and it really wasn't, technically, the Navy's proposal. That perhaps is only a minor point, but it made me provoked. When we get to the merits of the subject, I would like to quote from the Law that establishes Central Intelligence: ".....it shall be the

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duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council —

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security." In my mind the publicity of intelligence activities does definitely relate to the national security. Then we skip along to the last sentence of subparagraph (3), which reads: "And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

On the basis of that I was astonished that the attitude, as indicated on the part of Central Intelligence was one of apparent apathy toward this subject, because it seems to me it falls between — lies within the legal authority of the Central Intelligence Agency and to some extent to this Committee. Furthermore, it has been my experience that I need help and support. I can't handle this question of publicity single handed. It also seems to me that the CIA itself has suffered a great deal from too much publicity. And I have heard the Director say that he deplores publicity. It seems apparent from the newspapers that Central Intelligence, like ONI, is unable to handle it single handed. It seems to me this is a subject where the coordination of a united front is very much needed and it is appropriate for the National Security Council, in accordance with the Law and common sense, to try to evolve some coordinated policy with respect to publicity. Now that is all I have to say. If the other members of the Committee don't feel it is proper for the National Security Council to issue a directive, or should have National Security Council consideration, I have said my piece and I have nothing further to say.

DR. COLBY: I haven't much to add. As I remember your first statement it was not pertinent so much to the publicity of sources, but rather of the intelligence structure. Isn't that right? Their overall policies?

ADM. INGLIS: My opinion, for what it is worth, intelligence in any way, any angle, or slant of intelligence is not a proper subject for publicity. There should be no publicity about sources, procedures, methods, substance of intelligence, or anything else.

DR. COLBY: That, of course, is certainly conceded whether intelligence

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in any respect should appear in the public press. I don't think it should. I thought that was the point.

ADM. INGLIS: Intelligence sources and methods, and a very general statement that such intelligence activities as relate to the national security.

DR. COLBY: I think I would agree that it should be kept out of the press. It is not a departmental matter, certainly.

GEN. TODD: I share Admiral Inglis' view. It seems to me that we, in the past, have shut the door after the horse has gotten out and if we deal with each case in a piecemeal manner the water is over the dam before it even comes to our attention that harmful publicity has been given. When I was in the Intelligence Division and certainly since I have gone to the Joint Staff, we have had one headache after the other. I certainly don't think we should dismiss the matter and if we can't do it collectively we can do something about it and try to sell the bill to the National Security Council.

GEN. MOORE: Well, it was our general feeling that, in agreement with Mr. Armstrong, it could be handled by the Services and that aside from that I believe you get the same problem whether it is intelligence, operations, or plans - you get almost the same degree of publicity and since the Secretary of Defense has decided that censorship is impracticable in time of peace, whether we could apply it to intelligence if not to everything else is debatable, while rightfully admitting Admiral Inglis' view is desirable.

GEN. IRWIN: I would like to have the support of the policy because we have had a great deal of trouble refusing people. I believe it is possible that we could evolve the policy here by mutual agreement. You have all the Directors of Intelligence here.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Isn't the only thing you would obtain by such a directive is firmer and more centralized control over the employees of the departments and agencies of the Government, but isn't it a fact too that they aren't the culprits in this matter? It wouldn't extend to control of the press or radio or any form of publication. The NSC wouldn't set up

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censorship of that kind. All of the articles would have come out anyway.

ADM. INGLIS: That wasn't my thesis. I am not after the employees - CAF-4's and P-4's. We can control those people with no difficulty. I am, after, to name names, Rear Admiral Zacharias, USN(Ret.); I am after Alsop; I am after people who write articles for the Saturday Evening Post about CIA; Walter Winchell; Drew Pearson.

(DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD)

As to how you go about the people who write articles for the Saturday Evening Post, if the President were to approve this policy and if it was discovered that Zacharias or Alsop or whoever you may want to use as an example was about to have the Saturday Evening Post issue an article then you could write to the Editor of the Saturday Evening Post and invite his attention to the fact that the President had declared this to be contrary to the national interest and ask for their voluntary deletion of this particular article from their publication. Make it apply only to intelligence. You can't, as it was brought up here this afternoon, make this apply to everything the press does, but pick out a few very sensitive areas and ask for their cooperation. Most of the responsible editors would appreciate that and if it was a personal request of the President, they would probably do it. There would be a few who would jump the traces. This might be worked out in our informal discussions.

DIRECTOR: On that same thing, Souers told me in speaking to Mr. Forrestal that that is the thing Forrestal did not want because he called for the voluntary censorship and got burned and would absolutely disapprove.

ADM. INGLIS: That is as far as voluntary censorship is concerned, but if we picked out one or two narrowly restricted things which would be obvious to any thinking man, that it was contrary to the national interest, about 98% of the editors would do it. If you can suggest a better way of going about it, it suits me fine. It would be helpful to me in dealing with my superiors to back me up with an NSCID because I am a little guy over there and I just work there, I don't run the place.

DIRECTOR: Are there any objections? Do you object to having this if it can be obtained?

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GEN. MOORE: I wouldn't say we objected. I thought we were in the discussion phase.

DIRECTOR: I think I will go over and try it again and see what the people think about it.

GEN. MOORE: I have no objection.

ADM. INGLIS: If you don't want to get into the details, just a mere statement of policy would be all right with me. It is not necessary to say that the President is going to write to the editor of the Saturday Evening Post, leave that out, just an approved national policy.

DIRECTOR: I will make another stab at it and see what the boys say tomorrow and then if there is a willingness to accept it, we can draw up a paper. Anything else?

MR. ARMSTRONG: No.

DIRECTOR: Tommy?

ADM. INGLIS: No.

DIRECTOR: Dr. Colby?

DR. COLBY: No.

DIRECTOR: Gen. Todd?

GEN. TODD: No.

DIRECTOR: General Moore?

GEN. MOORE: No.

DIRECTOR: General Irwin?

GEN. IRWIN: No.

(DISCUSSION ON FURTHER MATTERS CONTINUED OFF THE RECORD)

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REMARKS: *Gen Wright: Check with DCI re Publicity as Adm. Inglis may bring that up again at next IAC Meeting. PZ*